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Abstract: Within the context of agent-based Monte-Carlo simulations, we
study the well-known majority-vote model (MVM) with noise applied to tax eva-
sion on simple square lattices, Voronoi-Delaunay random lattices, Barabasi-Albert
networks, and Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs. In the order to analyse and to control
the fluctuations for tax evasion in the economics model proposed by Zaklan, MVM
is applied in the neighborhod of the noise critical qc. The Zaklan model had been
studied recently using the equilibrium Ising model. Here we show that the Zaklan
model is robust and can be reproduced also through the nonequilibrium MVM on
various topologies.
Keywords: Opinion dynamics, Sociophysics, Majority vote, Nonequilib-
rium.
1. Introduction
The Ising model [1, 2] has been used during long time as a ”toy model” for
diverses objectives, as to test and to improve new algorithms and methods of
high precision for calculation of critical exponents in Equilibrium Statistical
Mechanics using the Monte Carlo method as Metropolis [3], Swendsen-Wang
[4], Wang-Landau [5] algorithms, Single histogram [6] and Broad histogram
[7] methods. The Ising model was already applied decades ago to explain
how a school of fish aligns into one direction for swimming [8] or how workers
decide whether or not to go on strike [9]. In the Latane´ model of Social Impact
[10] the Ising model has been used to give a consensus, a fragmentation into
many different opinions, or a leadership effect when a few people change the
opinion of lots of others. To some extent the voter model of Liggett [11] is an
Ising-type model: opinions follow the majority of the neighbourhood, similar
to Schelling [12], all these cited model and others can be found out in [13].
Realistic models of tax evasion appear to be necessary because tax eva-
sion remain to be a major predicament facing governments [14, 15, 16, 17].
Experimental evidence provided by Ga¨chter [18] indeed suggests that tax
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payers tend to condition their decision regarding whether to pay taxes or not
on the tax evasion decision of the members of their group. Frey and Torgler
[19] also provide empirical evidence on the relevance of conditional cooper-
ation for tax morale. Following the same context, recently, Zaklan et al.
[20, 21] developed an economics model to study the problem of tax evasion
dynamics using the Ising model through Monte-Carlo simulations with the
Glauber and heatbath algorithms ( that obey detailed balance - equilibrium)
to study the proposed model.
G. Grinstein et al. [22] have argued that nonequilibrium stochastic spin
systems on regular square lattices with up-down symmetry fall into the uni-
versality class of the equilibrium Ising model [22]. This conjecture was con-
firmed for various Archimedean lattices and in several models that do not
obey detailed balance [23, 24, 25, 26, 27]. The majority-vote model (MVM)
is a nonequilibrium model proposed by M.J. Oliveira in 1992 and defined
by stochastic dynamics with local rules and with up-down symmetry on a
regular lattice shows a second-order phase transition with critical exponents
β, γ, ν which characterize the system in the vicinity of the phase transition
identical [26, 28] with those of the equilibrim Ising model [1] for regular lat-
tices. Lima et al. [29] studied MVM on Voronoi-Delaunay random lattices
with periodic boundary conditions. These lattices posses natural quenched
disorder in their connections. They showed that presence of quenched con-
nectivity disorder is enough to alter the exponents β/ν and γ/ν from the
pure model and therefore that is a relevant term to such non-equilibrium
phase-transition with disagree with the arguments of G. Grinstein et al.
[22]. Recently, simulations on both undirected and directed scale-free net-
works [30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37], random graphs [38, 39] and social networks
[40, 41, 42], have attracted interest of researchers from various areas. These
complex networks have been studied extensively by Lima et al. in the con-
text of magnetism (MVM, Ising, and Potts model) [43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48],
econophysics models [21, 49] and sociophysics model [50].
In the present work, we study the behavior of the tax evasion on two-
dimensional square lattices using MVM dynamics and furthermore add a
policy makers’s tax enforcement mechanism consisting of two components: a
probability of an audit each person is subject to in every period and a length
of time detected tax evaders remain honest. We aim to extend the study of
Zaklan et al. [20, 21], which illustrates how different levels of enforcement
affect the tax evasion over time, as an alternative model of nonequilibrium
to the Ising model that is capable of reproduce the same results for analysis
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and control the fluctuation of the tax evasion. This MVM shows that the
Zaklan model is very robust for equilibruim and nonequilibrium models and
also for various topologies. This does not always happen with other models.
The remainder of our paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we
present the Zaklan model evolving with dynamics of MVM. In section 3 we
make an analysis of tax evasion dynamics with the Zaklan model on two-
dimensional square lattices using MVM for their temporal evolution under
different enforcement regimes; we discuss the results obtained. In section 4
we show that the MVM model also is capable to control the different levels of
the tax evasion analysed in section 3, as it was made by Zaklan et al. [21] us-
ing Ising models. We use the enforcement mechanism cited above on various
structures: square lattice, Voronoi-Delaunay random lattice, Baraba´si-Albert
network and Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graph; we discuss the resulting tax evasion dynam-
ics. Finally in section 5 we present our conclusions about the study of the
Zaklan model using MVM.
2. Zaklan model
On a square lattice where each site of the lattice is inhabited, at a time
step, by an agent with ”voters” or spin variables σ taking the values +1
representing an honest tax payer, or −1 trying to at least partially escape
her tax duty. Here is assumed that initially everybody is honest. Each period
individuals can rethink their behavior and have the opportunity to become
the opposite type of agent they were in previous period. In each time period
the system evolves by a single spin-flip dynamics with a probability wi given
by
wi(σ) =
1
2
[
1− (1− 2q)σiS
( ki∑
δ=1
σi+δ
)]
, (1)
where S(x) is the sign ±1 of x if x 6= 0, S(x) = 0 if x = 0, and the
summation runs over all ki nearest-neighbour sites σi+δ of σi. In this model
an agent assumes the value ±1 depending on the opinion of the majority of its
neighbors. The control noise parameter q plays the role of the temperature
in equilibrium systems and measures the probability of aligning antiparallel
to the majority of neighbors. Then various degrees of homogeneity regarding
either position are possible. An extremely homogenous group is entirely made
of honest people or tax evaders, depending of the sign S(x) of the majority
of neighbhors. If S(x) of the neighbors is zero the agent σi will be honest or
evader in the next time period with probability 1/2. We further introduce a
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probability of an efficient audit (p). Therefore, if tax evasion is detected, the
agent must remain honest for a number k of time steps. Here, one time step
is one sweep through the entire lattice.
3. Analysing tax evasion dynamics
Here then as Zaklan et al [20] we also use square lattices with lattice size
L = 1000 (L× L = 106 sites) and simulate tax evasion dynamics for various
values of q and various punishments (k). When k is zero, no punishment
is present and the model describes the baseline majority-vote model. Sev-
eral degrees of punishment are introduced for different noise (q) or ”Social
Temperature”, by setting k consecutively equal to 10 and 50 periods for all
considered levels of the noise. The probability of an audit is sequentially
increased, in steps, from 0 to 100 percent. For a given probability of an
audit the dynamics of the tax evasion (measured as portion of the entire
population) is shown over 300 time steps. Here, we have observed the be-
havior of tax evasion dynamics on a square lattice for high q = 0.70 and low
q = 0.050 noise values of the critical value for square lattices(qc = 0.075) the
MVM model. For both periods time punishment, K = 50 and 10, we also
use two probability of an audit is either at a realistic level (p = 0.05) or at
a rather high level (p = 0.9) values in this model. The tax evaders have the
greatest influence to turn honest citizens into tax evaders if they contitute
a majority in given neighbourhood. If the majority evades, one is likely to
also evade. On other way, if the majority of agents in the vicinity are honest,
the respective individual is likely to become a honest citizen even though it
has been a tax evader before. Therefore, in the fig. 1-3, have been showed
that on square lattice the MVM model (nonequilibrium model) is capable to
reproduce the same behavior and results for analysis of tax evasion levels,
as Zaklan et al. [20] made using the Ising model (equilibrium model) on
square lattices. How strong the influence from the neighbourhood is can be
controlled by adjusting or setting the noise parameter, q, next to (qc).
— Figure 1 goes about here —
In figure 1 we plot tax evasion for high noise q = 0.70, for punishment
periods k = 50 and 10. If the penalty is high enough, k = 50, tax evasion
can be reduced to 0% in the short run, given that the probability of an
audit p is sufficiently high. In the case of k = 50 and p = 90%, picture
(a) of Fig. 1, within only a few time steps each individual eventually is
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forced to remain honest. This happens, because the spins flip more often at
this noise, which is too high compared to the critical noise of this model in
the square lattice (qc = 0.075) [26], where qc is the critical noise for phase
transition of MVM on square lattice. In this picture (a) we observe peaks
of different levels of the tax evasion, that result from the fact that 90% of
the initial large number of tax evaders gets caught and after k iterations
becomes free to decide whether to evade or not. Moreover consecutive peaks
in non-compliance diminish less over time and it takes longer until perfect
non-compliance is established, further out on the time scale at which the
evolution of tax evasion is considered. Therefore, in our simulation using
MVM the perfect compliance is not attained in agreement with the results
observed for Zaklan et al. [20] using the Ising model where an equilibrium
level of about 2% non-compliance is attained.
If punishment is set equal to k = 10 periods (picture (b) of Fig. 1) tax
evasion reaches 0% in the first ten time steps and finally comes to rest at a
level of 10%. When the probability of an audit p = 0.05 is much lower the
tax evasion level reaches values for non-compliance of about 24% and 43%
in pictures (c) and (d), respectively, of Fig. 1. These two pictures show well
that punishment is a suitable enforcement mechanism when the probability
of an audit is set to a realistic level.
— Figure 2 and 3 goes about here —
We also consider two other noises above qc, q = 0.090, and below it,
q = 0.050. At q = 0.090 the individual becomes tax evader more slowly, be-
cause the tax evasion problem is less pronounced already from the beginning
compared to higher noises, because spins flip less frequently at lower noises,
the same enforcement mechanisms may work less efficintly in the short run
than at higher noise. Therefore as shown in Fig. 2 at q = 0.090 with k = 50
and p = 0.9 one clearly sees that evasion cannot be reduced to zero percent
any more. At q = 0.050 the shape of tax evasion is similar to q = 0.090, but
the level of tax evasion is smaller, because spins flip less frequently at lower
noises q = 0.050 as shown in Fig. 3, again enforcement mechanisms cannot
work efficiently in the short run as opposed to higher noise (q = 0.70). At
such low noise individuals seldomly decide to become non-compliant because
their vicinity which is mostly compliant on average exerts strong influence
on them to be honest as well. Therefore the equilibrium level of tax evasion
is smaller than at higher noises.
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4. Controlling the tax evasion dynamics
Here, we first will present the baseline case k = 0, i.e., no use of enforce-
ment, for different network structure. We use for square lattice q = 0.95qc, for
Voronoi-Delaunay lattice at q = qc = 0.117 (critical noise for MVM model
on Voronoi-Delaunay lattice), for Baraba´si-Albert q = 0.9qc = 0.306 and
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi q = 0.9qc = 0.181. All simulation are performed over 20, 000
time steps, it is showed in the fig. 4.
For very low noises the part of autonomous decisions almost completely
disappears. The individuals then base their decision solely on what most of
their neighbours do. A rising noise has the opposite effect. Individuals then
decide more autonomously. For the MVM model it is known that for q > qc,
half of the people are honest and other half cheat, while for q < qc states
correlated on cheating or compliance prevail for most of the time. Because
this behavior we set some values closed to qc, where the case that agents
distribute in equal proportions onto the two alternatives is excluded. Then
have been setting the noise parameter, q, closed to (qc = 0.075) on square
lattice, as suggested in the section 3, and ranging the degrees of punishment
(k = 1, 10 and 50) and audit probability rate (p = 0.5%, 10% and 90%).
Therefore, if tax evasion is detected, the enforcement mechanism (p) and
the period time of punishment k are triggered in order of to control the tax
evasion level. The individual remain honests for a certain number of periods,
as explained before in section 2 and 3. We also extend our study to other
networks as the Voronoi-Delaunay lattices, Baraba´si-Albert networks and
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graphs with N = 400 sites. As before the initial configurations
is with all honest agents (σi = +1) at fixed ”Social Temperature” (q). Here,
have been performed simulations of 10, 000 to 20, 000 time steps.
— Figure 4 goes about here —
In Fig. 4 we plot the baseline case k = 0, i.e., no use of enforcement, for
the square lattice (a), Voronoi-Delaunay (b), Baraba´si-Albert (c), and Erdo¨s-
Re´nyi (d) for dynamics of the tax evasion over 20, 000 time steps. Although
everybody is honest initially, it is impossible to predict which level of tax
compliance will be reached at some time step in the future.
— Figure 5 goes about here —
Figure 5 illustrates different simulation settings for square lattice, for
each considered combination of degree of punishment (k = 1, 10 and 50)
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and audit probability rate (p = 0.5%, 10% and 90%), where the tax evasion
is plotted over 10,000 time steps. Here we show that even a very small
level the enforcement (p = 0.5% and k = 1) suffices to reduce fluctuations
in tax evasion and to establish mainly compliance. Both a rise in audit
probability (greater p) and higher penalty (greater k) work to flatten the
time series of tax evasion and to shift the band of possible non-compliance
values towards more compliance. However, the simulations show that even
extreme enforcement measures ( p = 90% and k = 50) cannot fully solve the
problem of tax evasion.
— Figure 6 goes about here —
In Fig. 6 we display tax evasion for Voronoi-Delaunay random lattice,
Baraba´si-Albert network, and Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graph for different en-
forcement for k = 1, 10, and 50 with the same audit probability p = 1%. We
observe for the Voronoi-Delaunay random lattice and Baraba´si-Albert net-
work that the tax evasion level decreases with increasing time periods k of
punishment. For the case of the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graph the tax evasion
fluctuations for k = 1 and p = 1% , case (c), is identical to the baseline case
for this random graph, only for k = 10 and 50 at p = 1% the tax evasion
level decreases to about 48% (f) and 40% (i), showing that the control for
tax evasion for small audit probability p = 1% is more difficult to reach in
these Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs.
— Figure 7 goes about here —
In Fig. 7 we plot tax evasion for Baraba´si-Albert networks and Erdo¨s-
Re´nyi random graphs, again for different enforcement k = 1, 10, and 50, but
now with audit probability p = 4.5%. For Baraba´si-Albert networks the tax
evasion level decreases with increasing audit probability p showing that an
increase of the audit probability favors the control of tax evasion. Again,
for k = 1 and p = 4.5% (d) the tax evasion for the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graphs is
identical for case baseline and the case (c) of Fig. 6, showing that for these
random graphs the time period k of punishment is important to control tax
evasion.
5. Conclusion
In summary, tax evasion can vary widely across nations, reaching ex-
tremely high values in some developing countries. Wintrobe and Ge¨rxhani
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[51] explains the observed higher level of tax evasion in generally less devel-
oped countries with a lower amount of trust that people have in governmental
institutions. In this work we show that Zaklan’s model is very robust for anal-
ysis and control of tax evasion, using dynamics with equilibrium [21], Ising
model, and also nonequilibrium, MVM. The Zaklan model is also found to
be robust in various topologies used here.
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Figure 1: Tax evasion dynamics for high ”social temprature” q = 0.70 (qc =
0.075) and 300 time step, L = 1000 (106 sites), with length of punishment
at either k = 50 or 10 periods and two different probabilites of an audit, i.e.
p = 0.05 and p = 0.9 .
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Figure 2: Tax evasion dynamics for ”social temperature” q = 0.090 (qc =
0.075). The same simulation design as in figure 1.
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Figure 3: Tax evasion dynamics for ”social temprature” q = 0.050. The same
simulation design as in figure 1.
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Figure 4: Baseline case for different network structure. Where we use for
square lattice q = 0.95qc, for Voronoi-Delaunay lattice at q = qc = 0.117
(critical noise for MVM model on Voronoi-Delaunay lattice), for Baraba´si-
Albert q = 0.9qc = 0.306 and Erdo¨s-Re´nyi q = 0.9qc = 0.181. All simulation
are performed over 20, 000 time steps.
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Figure 5: The square lattice model of tax evasion with various degrees p of
enforcement. q = 0.95qc and 20, 000 time steps.
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Figure 6: The first column displays tax evasion for different enforcement
regimes for Voronoi-Delaunay network ((a), (d), and (g)). The next two
column depict the tax evasion for Baraba´si-Albert network ((b), (e), and
(h)) and Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graph((c), (f), and (i)). Again, we use 10, 000 time
steps.
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Figure 7: The first line display the resulting tax evasion for different enforce-
ment regimes for Baraba´si-Albert networks ((a), (b), and (c)) for degrees of
punishment k = 1, 10 and 50 and audit probability p = 4.5%,. The second
line depicts tax evasion for Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graphs( (d), (e), and (f)) for the
same values the case as line 1. Again, we use 10, 000 time steps.
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